יום שני, מרץ 19, 2007
Does Pakistan have a right to exist?
Continuing with an occasional theme here about the notion of a state's "right to exist," via The Moderate Voice I came across a summary of a new book called Divide Pakistan, by Syed Jamaluddin. In the first paragraph of the summary, the author says:
The post-partition fates of India and Pakistan are relevant for comparative analysis of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as both sets of states (or proposed states) came about through UN-mandated partition in the early post-WWII decolonization period. Of course, there are numerous differences between the two cases, and the differences may well be more significant than the parallels. Nonetheless, it is worth thinking about the India-Pakistan partition, for, as in the Israel-Palestine case, one of the post-partition states has been a successful multiethnic and multireligious democracy, while the other is a failed state (or a non-state, which is an even more dramatic degree of failure, I suppose).
However, Jamaluddin's premise is unsatisfactory, and for precisely the reason I just alluded to. India, like Pakistan (and more so than either Israel or, especially, Palestine) is itself an assemblage of numerous "nations" (including various Muslim groups). Yet it has worked. Why not Pakistan? It is almost self-evident that East and West were not going to be viable in one state (lesson for Gaza and the West Bank?), and indeed the former East Pakistan has existed as the separate state of Bangladesh now for more than 35 years (not with great success, though more so than for the remainder of Pakistan). As for the current state of Pakistan, only in hindsight is it "obvious" that Balochis and Sindhis (etc.) can't coexist in one state. Jamaluddin proposes that Pakistan be further partitioned into its eight component nations (as he identifies them). I have no idea whether that would be a good idea (independent of whether it is achievable), but I am not convinced that, at the time of partition, it was so obvious that Pakistan would fail and India would succeed as viable multiethnic states.
India's democratic strength for the last 59 years has proved that its existence was fully justified. On the contrary, Pakistan emerged as a failed state for one single reason that a country which was founded by assembling almost eight different nations in the name of Islam, was unable to justify its existence.
The post-partition fates of India and Pakistan are relevant for comparative analysis of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as both sets of states (or proposed states) came about through UN-mandated partition in the early post-WWII decolonization period. Of course, there are numerous differences between the two cases, and the differences may well be more significant than the parallels. Nonetheless, it is worth thinking about the India-Pakistan partition, for, as in the Israel-Palestine case, one of the post-partition states has been a successful multiethnic and multireligious democracy, while the other is a failed state (or a non-state, which is an even more dramatic degree of failure, I suppose).
However, Jamaluddin's premise is unsatisfactory, and for precisely the reason I just alluded to. India, like Pakistan (and more so than either Israel or, especially, Palestine) is itself an assemblage of numerous "nations" (including various Muslim groups). Yet it has worked. Why not Pakistan? It is almost self-evident that East and West were not going to be viable in one state (lesson for Gaza and the West Bank?), and indeed the former East Pakistan has existed as the separate state of Bangladesh now for more than 35 years (not with great success, though more so than for the remainder of Pakistan). As for the current state of Pakistan, only in hindsight is it "obvious" that Balochis and Sindhis (etc.) can't coexist in one state. Jamaluddin proposes that Pakistan be further partitioned into its eight component nations (as he identifies them). I have no idea whether that would be a good idea (independent of whether it is achievable), but I am not convinced that, at the time of partition, it was so obvious that Pakistan would fail and India would succeed as viable multiethnic states.
תוויות: Pakistan, right to exist, state, Syed Jamaluddin
יום שני, מרץ 12, 2007
Right to exist and recognition
German Chancellor Angela Merkel says that it is important to emphasize that Germany supports Israel and that protecting Israel's right to exist will continue to stand at the center of Germany's foreign policy. "I regret that I am forced to reiterate this repeatedly," the chancellor added.
Indeed, it is regrettable that she feels "forced" to reiterate this. But note the neat way in which she (or the Haaretz reporter who summarized her words at the annual European-Israel Dialogue held in Berlin this weekend) elides the question of "support for Israel" with "Israel's right to exist." These are regularly treated as one in the same. They are not.
The very phrase "right to exist" has long troubled me. Of course, every state should recognize every other state that has been admitted to the United Nations. But the idea of "right to exist" is beside the point. Is there any other nation--aside from the non-state of Palestine, that is--where the question of its "right to exist" ever comes up?
States, per se, do not have rights to exist. They simply exist. Like Israel and 190 other states, including several recently recognized states that were previously occupied by a neighboring state (Eritrea, Timor-Leste, Estonia, etc.). Or they do not. Like Palestine. (And Kurdistan and Somaliland, which function in many ways like states, but are not recognized as such.)
States are nothing more than organizations with hierarchical authority over some population living within a bounded territory. Some have more effective authority than others--Pakistan, for example, hardly has any authority over parts of its territory, and the same can be said for numerous other states in the developing world. And some states have never established an ultimate definition of the territory over which they seek to have hierarchical authority. Like Israel, for example.
Then there is, of course, the question of recognition. This is what it boils down to: Does one state recognize that the other exists, and exchange ambassadors with it? Mixing this up with questions of "rights" of a state to exist is a dead end. The Israeli state does not recognize a Palestinian state, and thus it is utterly pointless to expect the government of the non-state of Palestine to recognize the Israeli state, much less to recognize that it is "right" to exist.
Recognition will come--if ever--as the mutual recognition of two states, Israel and Palestine, with defined borders and with ambassadors in one another's capitals (Jerusalem for both?). In the mean time, always making it a question of "right" and requiring the Palestinian non-state to recognize the Israeli state as a precondition for even talking about everything else is nothing but a way to ensure the conflict will never be resolved.
Indeed, it is regrettable that she feels "forced" to reiterate this. But note the neat way in which she (or the Haaretz reporter who summarized her words at the annual European-Israel Dialogue held in Berlin this weekend) elides the question of "support for Israel" with "Israel's right to exist." These are regularly treated as one in the same. They are not.
The very phrase "right to exist" has long troubled me. Of course, every state should recognize every other state that has been admitted to the United Nations. But the idea of "right to exist" is beside the point. Is there any other nation--aside from the non-state of Palestine, that is--where the question of its "right to exist" ever comes up?
States, per se, do not have rights to exist. They simply exist. Like Israel and 190 other states, including several recently recognized states that were previously occupied by a neighboring state (Eritrea, Timor-Leste, Estonia, etc.). Or they do not. Like Palestine. (And Kurdistan and Somaliland, which function in many ways like states, but are not recognized as such.)
States are nothing more than organizations with hierarchical authority over some population living within a bounded territory. Some have more effective authority than others--Pakistan, for example, hardly has any authority over parts of its territory, and the same can be said for numerous other states in the developing world. And some states have never established an ultimate definition of the territory over which they seek to have hierarchical authority. Like Israel, for example.
Then there is, of course, the question of recognition. This is what it boils down to: Does one state recognize that the other exists, and exchange ambassadors with it? Mixing this up with questions of "rights" of a state to exist is a dead end. The Israeli state does not recognize a Palestinian state, and thus it is utterly pointless to expect the government of the non-state of Palestine to recognize the Israeli state, much less to recognize that it is "right" to exist.
Recognition will come--if ever--as the mutual recognition of two states, Israel and Palestine, with defined borders and with ambassadors in one another's capitals (Jerusalem for both?). In the mean time, always making it a question of "right" and requiring the Palestinian non-state to recognize the Israeli state as a precondition for even talking about everything else is nothing but a way to ensure the conflict will never be resolved.
תוויות: Israel, recognition, right to exist, state
